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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria
based on diﬀerent dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999)
pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination
does not necessarily coincide with that under strict domination. We show that, if
a game satisﬁes the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic
substitutability, then the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict domi-
nation contains that under weak domination. The above three conditions are met
by standard Cournot oligopoly games and participation games in a mechanism
producing a public good.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on
diﬀerent dominance relations. The notion of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium was
introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) and is known as a reﬁnement of
Nash equilibria based on the stability against credible coalitional deviations. However,
there are two ways for a coalition to improve payoﬀs to its members. We consider the
following two dominance relations:
(i) Strategy proﬁle x strictly dominates strategy proﬁle y if there exists a coalition
S such that all members of S can be better oﬀ by switching y to x, taking the
strategies of the players outside S as given.
(ii) Strategy proﬁle x weakly dominates strategy proﬁle y if there exists a coalition S
such that all members are not worse oﬀ and at least one member of the coalition
is better oﬀ by deviating from y to x, holding the strategies of the others ﬁxed.
Under the notion of strict domination, all of the deviating players are better oﬀ,
while, under that of weak domination, all members of a coalition are at least as well oﬀ,
and at least one of them is better oﬀ. Thus, the set of equilibria under weak domination
may be a subset of that under strict domination. This indeed applies to the strong Nash
equilibrium introduced by Aumann (1959) and the core.
However, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict domination does not
contain that under weak domination. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) provided
an example in which the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination
and that under strict domination are both non-empty and their intersection is empty.1
They also showed that, in the class of common agency games, any coalition-proof Nash
1Another solution concept that is sensitive to the notions of coalitional deviation is von Neumann
and Morgenstern stable set. See Greenberg (1992).
2equilibria under weak domination is that under strict domination.
In this study, we consider the class of games with n players in which the strategy
space of each player is a subset of the real line. This class includes standard Cournot
oligopoly games as well as voluntary participation games in a mechanism producing a
public good.2 We show that, if a game satisﬁes the conditions of anonymity, monotone
externality, and strategic substitutability, then the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under weak domination is included in that under strict domination. Anonymity states
that the payoﬀs of every player depend on his strategy and on the sum of other players’
strategies. Monotone externality requires that a switch in a player’s strategies change the
payoﬀs to all the other players in the same direction. Strategic substitutability means
that the incentive to every player to reduce his strategy gets higher as the sum of the
other players’ strategies increases. Yi (1999) introduced all of the conditions and proved
that, under the three conditions, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria with strict
domination coincides with the weakly Pareto eﬃcient frontier of the set of Nash equilibria.
However, we do not apply Yi’s (1999) result to the proof of our result. Furthermore, our
result cannot be derived from Yi’s (1999) result. The inclusion relation between the sets
of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under the two diﬀerent dominance relations holds for
the games that have interested economists, such as standard Cournot oligopoly games
and voluntary participation games in a mechanism producing public goods.
2 The Model
We consider a strategic game G = [N; (Xi)i2N; (ui)i2N], where N is a ﬁnite set of
players, Xi is the set of pure strategies of player i that is a subset of real numbers, and
ui:
Q
j2N Xj ! R is the payoﬀ function of player i. In this paper, we focus solely on
pure strategy equilibria. Before the coalition-proof Nash equilibria are deﬁned, some
2Note that common agency games do not belong to this class.
3notations will be introduced. For any coalition S µ N, xS 2
Q
j2S Xj designates a
strategy proﬁle of S. For any xN 2
Q
j2N Xj, xN is denoted by x. For any set of players
S, ¡S represents the complement of S.
The notions of coalition-proof Nash equilibria are deﬁned under strict domination
and weak domination. First, restricted games are introduced. For any coalition S µ N
and any strategy proﬁle of the complement of S, ¯ x¡S, denote the game restricted by
¯ x¡S by Gj¯ x¡S in which S is the set of players,
Q
j2S Xj is the set of pure strategy
proﬁles, and ui(¢; ¯ x¡S):
Q
j2S Xj ! R is player i’s payoﬀ function. Now, the deﬁnitions
of coalition-proof Nash equilibria are provided under the diﬀerent dominance relations.
Deﬁnition 1 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak domination is deﬁned in-
ductively with respect to the number of players n in the game:
(i) If n = 1, then x¤
1 2 X1 is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak domination
if and only if u1(x¤
1) ¸ u1(e x1) for any e x1 2 X1.
(ii) Let n > 1. Assume that the coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination
have been deﬁned for games with fewer than n players.
(a) For any game G with n players, x¤ 2
Q
j2N Xj is a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle
under weak domination if, for all S ( N, x¤
S 2
Q
j2S Xj is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under weak domination of the reduced game Gjx¤
¡S.
(b) Proﬁle x¤ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak domination of G
if it is a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under weak domination and there is no
other self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under weak domination b x 2
Q
j2N Xj such
that ui(b x) ¸ ui(x¤) for all i 2 N and ui(b x) > ui(x¤) for some i 2 N.
Deﬁnition 2 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under strict domination is deﬁned in-
ductively with respect to the number of players n in the game:
4(i) If n = 1, then x¤
1 2 X1 is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under strict domination
if and only if u1(x¤
1) ¸ u1(e x1) for any e x1 2 X1.
(ii) Let n > 1, and assume that a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under strict domi-
nation is deﬁned for games with fewer than n players.
(a) For any game G with n players, x¤ 2
Q
j2N Xj is a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle
under strict domination if, for all S ( N, x¤
S 2
Q
j2S Xj is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium under strict domination of the reduced game Gjx¤
¡S.
(b) Proﬁle x¤ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under strict domination if it is a
self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination and if there does not exist
another self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination b x 2
Q
j2N Xj of
G such that ui(b x) > ui(x¤) for all i 2 N.
The main diﬀerence between the two notions of coalition-proof Nash equilibria lies in
the notions of coalitional deviations. The idea behind the coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under weak domination is that a coalition deviates if all members in the coalition are
at least as well oﬀ and at least one of them is better oﬀ. On the other hand, under
strict domination, a coalition deviates only if every member of the coalition is better oﬀ.
Note that, under either of the dominance relations, coalition-proof Nash equilibria and
self-enforcing strategy proﬁles are Nash equilibria. In games with two players, the set
of self-enforcing strategy proﬁles coincides with that of Nash equilibria, since coalitions
consist of only two or fewer players. Hence, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under weak domination coincides with the (strictly) Pareto eﬃcient frontier of the set
of Nash equilibria, and so does the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict
domination with the weakly Pareto eﬃcient frontier of that of Nash equilibria. Therefore,
the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination is a subset of that under
strict domination in two-player games. However, the inclusion relation between the sets
5of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under the two diﬀerent dominance relations does not
necessarily hold in games with more than two players. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber
(1999) presented an example in which the sets of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under
strict and weak dominations are disjoint.
Example 1 (Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber, 1999) Consider the game with three
players depicted in Table 1, in which agent 1 chooses rows, agent 2 chooses columns, and
agent 3 chooses matrices. The ﬁrst entry in each box is agent 1’s payoﬀ, the second
is agent 2’s, and the third is agent 3’s. There exist two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
(a1;b1;c2) and (a2;b2;c1), where the former is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under
weak domination but not that under strict domination, and the latter is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium under strict domination but not that under weak domination. In this
example, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination is not a subset
of that under strict domination.
3 Result
In this section, we establish suﬃcient conditions under which the set of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria under weak domination is a subset of that of a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under strict domination.
The ﬁrst condition is that of anonymity.






j6=i b xj, then ui(xi;x¡i) = ui(xi;b x¡i).
The anonymity condition means that the payoﬀ function of every player depends on
his strategy and on the aggregate strategy of all other players.
The next condition is that of monotone externality. The condition states that the
6payoﬀs to every player are either non-increasing or non-decreasing with respect to the
sum of strategies of the other players.






j6=i b xj, then either ui(xi;x¡i) ¸ ui(xi;b x¡i) or ui(xi;x¡i) · ui(xi;b x¡i) holds.
If the former holds, the condition means positive externalities, and it represents negative
externalities if the latter is satisﬁed.
The third condition is that of strategic substitutability. Under this condition, the
incentive of every player to reduce his strategy gets higher as the sum of the other
players’ strategies increases.
Strategic substitutability. For all i 2 N, all xi; b xi 2 Xi, and all x¡i; b x¡i 2
Q
j6=i Xj,




j6=i b xj, then ui(xi;x¡i)¡ui(b xi;x¡i) < ui(xi;b x¡i)¡ui(b xi;b x¡i).
Proposition. Suppose that a game satisﬁes anonymity, monotone externality, and
strategic substitutability. Then, any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak dom-
ination is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under strict domination.
Proof. If the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination is empty,
then the statement of proposition is vacuously true. Hence, we consider the case in which
there is a coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination in the game. Let us
assume that a game satisﬁes anonymity, positive externality, and strategic substitutabil-
ity.3 We show by induction that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak
domination is a subset of that under strict domination. Clearly, the statement is true
for all games with a single player. In any two-player game, under either dominance re-
lations, the set of self-enforcing strategy proﬁles coincides with that of Nash equilibria.
Hence, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination coincides with
3We can similarly show the statement in the case of negative externality.
7the Pareto eﬃcient frontier of the set of Nash equilibria, and so does the set of coalition-
proof Nash equilibria under strict domination with the weakly Pareto eﬃcient frontier
of that of Nash equilibria. As a result, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under
strict domination contains that under weak domination in every two-player game.
Let n ¸ 3, and suppose that any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak dom-
ination is a coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict domination for any game with
fewer than n players as an induction hypothesis. Let x¤ denote a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under weak domination of a game with n players. We need to show that x¤
is a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination and that there is not other
self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination e x where ui(e x) > ui(x¤) for every
i 2 N.
Lemma 1 Any self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under weak domination is that under strict
domination.
The lemma above can be shown in the following way. Let x be a self-enforcing strategy
proﬁle under weak domination of G. Then, by deﬁnition, xC is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under weak domination in the restricted game Gjx¡C for every proper subset
C of N. By the induction hypothesis, xC is also a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under
strict domination in Gjx¡C. That is, for all proper subsets C of N, xC is a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium under strict domination of Gjx¡C. Hence, x is a self-enforcing strategy
proﬁle under strict domination of G.
By Lemma 1, x¤ is a self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination.
Lemma 2 There is no other self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under strict domination e x
such that ui(e x) > ui(x¤) for all i 2 N.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us suppose, on the contrary, that there is a self-enforcing
strategy proﬁle under strict domination e x, at which ui(e x) > ui(x¤) for all i 2 N. Then,
8e x must satisfy the following condition.





j6=i e xj for all i 2 N.











j6=i e xj, then we have ui(x¤) ¸ ui(e xi;x¤
¡i) =





j6=i e xj, then we have ui(x¤) ¸ ui(e xi;x¤
¡i) by the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium and
ui(e xi;x¤
¡i) ¸ ui(e x) by positive externality. Therefore, we obtain ui(x¤) ¸ ui(e x). This is
a contradiction. k
Claim 2 The strategy proﬁle e x is not a Nash equilibrium of G.














k2N e xk. Therefore, i 2 N exists such that e xi > x¤
i. By strategic substitutability, for
player i, we have ui(x¤
i;e x¡i)¡ui(e x) > ui(x¤)¡ui(e xi;x¤
¡i). Since x¤ is a Nash equilibrium,
ui(x¤) ¡ ui(e xi;x¤
¡i) ¸ 0. Therefore, ui(x¤
i;e x¡i) > ui(e x), which implies that e x is not a
Nash equilibrium of G. This contradicts the idea that e x is a self-enforcing strategy
proﬁle under strict domination. Thus, there is no self-enforcing strategy proﬁle under
strict domination that dominates x¤, which implies that x¤ is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium under strict domination in the n-person game. ¥
Remark 1 We use none of three conditions in the proof of Lemma 1. Thus, Lemma 1
holds true in every game. Note that we use the conditions only when we prove Lemma
2.
Many interesting games in economics satisfy the conditions above. For instance,
Cournot oligopoly games and the other games that have been studied as a part of indus-
trial organization theory satisfy the conditions. For details, refer to Yi (1999). Here, we
give an example in the context of the provision of pure public goods.
9Example 2 (Participation games in the mechanism implementing the Lin-
dahl allocation) Consider an economy in which there is one pure public good, one
private good, n players, and a mechanism that implements the Lindahl allocation rule.4
Saijo and Yamato (1999) introduced a model of voluntary participation in a public good
mechanism. Their model consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, players decide si-
multaneously whether or not they will participate in the public good mechanism. In
the second stage, only the participants play the mechanism. Following the rule of the
mechanism, they produce the public good and distribute its cost. On the other hand,
non-participants can enjoy the public good produced by the participants at no cost. As
a result, the participants bear the cost of the public good, but the non-participants can
free-ride the public good.
In this example, we suppose that the preference relations of all players are represented
by the same quasi-linear utility function ui(z; ti) = ®
p
z+ti, where ® > 0, z ¸ 0 denotes
the public good and ti · 0 represents a payment of i for producing the public good. We
assume that one unit of the public good is provided from one unit of the private good.
We ﬁx an outcome of the mechanism as the Lindahl allocation only for the preferences
of participants.
First, we will characterize the equilibrium outcome of the second stage. Let p be
the number of participants in the mechanism. The equilibrium allocation of the second




public good provision zp maximizes the total surplus of participants p®
p
z ¡ z. Hence,
we have zp = (®p=2)
2. Since every participant shares the cost of zp equally at the Lindahl
allocation in the case of identical agents, every participant i pays t
p
i = ¡zp=p = ¡®2p=4.
On the other hand, t
p
j = 0 for every non-participant j. If the payoﬀs of participants
and non-participants are denoted by u1(p) and u0(p), respectively, then we have u1(p) =
4Many authors have constructed the mechanisms that attain the Lindahl allocation in their equilib-
rium. See Tian (2000), for example.
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p
(®p=2)2 ¡ ®2p=4 = ®2p=4 and u0(p) = ®
p
(®p=2)2 = ®2p=2.
Given the equilibrium outcome of the second stage, the participation decision stage
can be reduced to the following simultaneous game. In the game, each player i chooses
either xi = 1 (participation) or xi = 0 (non-participation), simultaneously. In this stage,
the set of actions of player i is Xi = f0; 1g.5 Let px be the number of participants
at an action proﬁle x = (x1;:::;xn). Then, px participants obtain the utility u1(px),
and n ¡ px non-participants have the payoﬀ u0(px) at the action proﬁle x. The payoﬀ
matrix of the participation stage game in the case of n = 3 appears in Table 2. In
this example, the anonymity condition is satisﬁed, since payoﬀs to both participants and
non-participants depend on the number of participants. The participation decision game
satisﬁes the positive externality condition because the utilities of participants and non-
participants get higher as the number of participants increases. The diﬀerence u1(p) ¡
u0(p ¡ 1) = ®2(¡p + 2)=4 is decreasing with respect to the number of participants
p, which implies that the incentive to participate in the mechanism decreases as the
number of participants increases. Therefore, the strategic substitutability condition holds
in this example. From Proposition, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under
strict domination contains that under weak domination. In fact, two agents choose
participation in every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak domination, while
one agent or two agents participate in the mechanism in coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under strict domination in this example.6
Remark 2 The conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic substi-
tutability do not necessarily guarantee equivalence between coalition-proof Nash equi-
libria under the two diﬀerent dominance relations. In fact, the participation decision
game in Example 2 satisﬁes all of the conditions, but there is a coalition-proof Nash
5Only the pure strategies are considered.
6Shinohara (2003) characterized the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination of
the participation decision game in the public good mechanism.
11equilibrium under strict domination which is not that under weak domination.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict and
weak dominations was examined. In many equilibrium concepts, such as the core and
strong Nash equilibria, the set of equilibrium concept under weak domination is a subset
of that under strict domination. However, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under strict domination and that under weak domination are not necessarily related by
inclusion. We showed that, if a game satisﬁes the properties of anonymity, monotone
externality, and strategic substitutability, then the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under weak domination is a subset of that of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict
domination. This implies that the inclusion relation between the two sets of coalition-
proof Nash equilibria holds true in such interesting games studied in economics as the
participation game in a public good mechanism and the standard Cournot oligopoly
game.
The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is well known as a reﬁnement of the Nash
equilibrium. However, little is known about the structure of the equilibria. This paper
has focused on the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria and dominance
relations. Although diﬀerent strategies may be used in coalition-proof Nash equilibria
under the diﬀerent dominance relations, their relationship had not been studied so far.
The objective of this paper was to give an answer to this problem. Clarifying other
properties of this equilibrium concept may be left for future researches.
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Table 2: Payoﬀ matrix of the participation decision game with n = 3. (Example 2)
14